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Criminality in the Law of War
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T

here are two completely different aspects of the subject of criminality in
the law of war insofar as prisoners of war are concerned-offenses
committed before capture (pre-capture offenses or war crimes); and offenses
committed after capture (post-capture offenses). Many of the rules applicable
are similar or identical, but some are different. The two aspects of the problem
are certainly worthy of separate treatment. They will be so treated and in the
order mentioned.
Pre-capture Offenses (War Crimes)

Historical
By offenses committed before capture we normally refer to violations of the
law of war committed against the nationals, civilian or military, or the property,
of the Capturing Power or of one of its allies. Despite a rather widespread
misunderstanding on the subject, there was nothing new about the war crimes
trials conducted after World War II except their numbers and the broad range
of the offenses charged. One author has given considerable publicity to a case
which occurred in 1474 in wpich an ad hoc international tribunal tried one Peter
von Hagenbach for various crimes committed while he was in command of
what might be termed a military occupation, although the war was yet to come.
Hagenbach pleaded that he had only obeyed the orders of his master, the Duke
of Burgundy. His defense was rejected, he was found guilty, and he was
executed.!
Mter the termination of hostilities in the American Civil War (1861-1865),
a conflict which had most of the characteristics of an international war, the
Federal authorities conducted a number of trials of individuals for offenses
2
committed against Union prisoners of war during the course of the conflict.
During the pacification of the Philippines which followed the acquisition of
those islands by the United States as a result ofthe Spanish-American War (1898),
a number of American officers were tried by American Army courts-martial for
violations of the law of war. 3 (This is another area where there is a good deal
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of misunderstanding. While these men were tried for violations of specific
provisions of the American Anny's "Articles of War," the offenses for which
they were tried were also violations of the law of war and their trials would have
been denominated "war crimes trials" if they had been tried by an enemy, or
an international court.) And at about this same period the British Anny not only
tried some of its own personnel for violations of the law of war committed
during the hostilities in the Boer War (1899-1902),4 but the Treaty of
Vereeniging (1902) which ended that conflict specifically provided for British
courts-martial for certain Boers who had allegedly committed acts "contrary to
5
the usages of war."
Mter the end of World War I a "Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties" created by the
Versailles Peace Conference recommended criminal prosecution for all persons,
without distinction of rank, "who have been guilty of offenses against the laws
and customs of war or the laws of humanity.,,6 The Peace Conference
implemented that recommendation with Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of
Versaille/ by which Gennany recognized the right of the Allies to conduct trials
for violations of the laws and customs of war and promised to hand over the
individuals requested for trial by a requesting Ally. Public opinion prevented a
weak Gennan government from complying with those provisions and
agreement was reached for trials to be conducted by the Supreme Court of
Leipzig. The results of the twelve trials which were conducted were so
unsatisfactory to the fonner Allies that they dropped the matter. 8 This episode
convinced most students of the problem that the Versailles solution to the
problem was not a viable one. (The so-called "war crimes trials" conducted by
the Federal Republic of Gennany itself since the end of World War II do not
disprove that conclusion. For the most part they have involved the trials of
Gennans for offenses against Gennans, where no nationalism is involved; and
when they were begun sufficient time had elapsed for a change ofpublic attitude
and a cooling of wartime patriotism.)

Codification
All that has been mentioned up to this point was in the realm of the customary
law of war. In a 1906 Convention for the protection of the wounded and sick
there was a provision by which the Parties agreed, if their laws were then
insufficient, to seek from their legislatures
"the necessary measures to repress, in time of war, individual acts of robbery or
ill treatment of the sick and. wounded of the armies, as well as to punish, as
usurpations of military insignia, the wrongful use of the flag and brassard of the
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Red Cross by military persons or private individuals not protected by the present
convention. ,,9

This was, of course, a call for national legislation to provide for the
punishment of certain specific war crimes. Little was done to implement this
provision; but the 1929 version of this Convention went even further when the
Parties agreed therein to seek from their legislatures
"the necessary measures for the repression in time of war of any act contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention.,,10

(For some reason there was no comparable provision in the prisoner-of-war
convention drafted at the same time by the same Diplomatic Conference.)
The first real international codification in this area, if such it can be called,
was the 1945 London Charter drafted and signed by France, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, and the United States, to which 19 other states subsequendy
11
adhered. It was, of course the basis for the Nuremberg Trial. A number of the
other war crimes trials in Germany which followed World War II were based
on an adaptation of the London Charter by the four Powers governing occupied
Germany, issued either joindy or severally.12 However, most of the several
thousand war crimes trials which followed World War II, both in Europe and
in the Pacific, were based on the customary law of war and were conducted by
13
courts established by individual states. It was not until the drafting of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims that we find true
codification in this area of international law. Those Conventions contained two
articles which, with appropriate and understandable differences, were common
to all ofthem. 14 The articles contained in the 1949 Third (prisoners-of-War)
Convention read as follows:
Article 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, ifit prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a primafade
case.
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Each High Contracting Parties shall take measures necessary for the suppression
of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the
grave breaches defined in the following article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper
trial and defense, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article
105 and those following of the present Convention.
Article 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention.
Ifyou analyze the provisions of these two articles you will find that the Parties
to these Conventions have:
a. specifically established a number of substantive penal offenses which they have
characterized as "grave breaches" of the Conventions;
b. agreed to universal jurisdiction (of Parties to the Conventions) over those
offenses;
c. indicated that trials for "grave breaches" of the Conventions will be conducted
by national courts;
d. agreed that they will either themselves try any accused found in their territory
or will extradite that accused to any other Party concerned who makes out a prima
Jacie case (aut dedere aut punire);15 and
e. guaranteed .. fair trial for any person accused of having committed such a grave
breach.
The procedural rules relating to the trials and punishment of prisoners of war
contained in the 1949 Third (prisoner-of-War) Convention, set forth in some
detail below in the discussion of post-capture offenses, would be equally
applicable with respect to pre-capture offenses. However, it is probably
appropriate to mention here that although Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention provides that prisoners of war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses
"retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention," a number
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of states have made reservations to that article, insisting upon the right to treat
such individuals as common criminals after they have been finally convicted and
.
16
wet
hi! hey serve thelr sentences.
In 1977 a Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was signed which
elaborated considerably on the provisions quoted above. 17 Articles 11, 75(2),
and 85 of this Protocol repeat many of the offenses listed in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. They also add to the list contained in the Conventions a number
ofoffenses which cannot be considered as being established penal offenses; rather,
they are offenses more closely related to the conduct of war. These offenses
include such matters as making the civilian population the object of attack; or
the launching of an attack against an installation known to contain dangerous
forces, such as a nuclear generating plant; or attacking an undefended locality;
or attacking an individual who is hOTS de combat; etc.
Although the Diplomatic Conference which drafted this Protocol was unable
to reach agreement on the question of the defense of "superior orders," it did
agree on provisions making superiors responsible for the acts of a subordinate
"if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude
in the circumstances at the time, that he was conunitting or was going to conunit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach."
(Article 86(2»

It also agreed on provisions making it the duty of a commander who is aware
that persons under his control
"are going to conunit or have conunitted a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or
penal action against violators thereoE" (Article 87(3».

Presumably, should the commander fail to comply with the foregoing ~rovisions
of Article 87(3), he would be punishable under Article 86(2), above. 8
Article 88 of the 1977 Protocol I is entided "Mutual assistance in criminal
matters;" and Article 89 is entided "Co-operation." As is not unusual in this
area, where politics determine policy, these articles express pious statements
rather than positive rules:
"The High Contracting Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings in respect of grave breaches;"
(Article 88(1».
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". . . when circumstances pennit, the High Contracting Parties shall co-operate
in the matter of extradition;" (Article 88(2».
" ... The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not, however, affect the
obligations arising from the provisions of any other treaty of a bilateral or
multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the subject
of mutual assistance in criminal matters;" (Article 88(3».
" ... the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in
co-operation with the United Nations." (Article 89).

On the other hand, Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I, entitled "Fundamental
guarantees," does affirmatively set forth the whole gamut ofprotections to which
a person charged with an offense "related to the armed conflict" or "arising out
of the hostilities" is to be afforded. Thus, he is entitled to be informed of the
reason for his arrest. He is to be tried by "an impartial and regularly constituted
court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure;" and those "generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure" are enumerated at length. Suffice to say that if they are applied by
a truly impartial court (if any court trying enemy military or civilian personnel
in time of war can be such!), no accused could complain that he Fad not had a
fair trial.

Mercenaries
There is one aspect of the 1977 Protocol I which requires special
mention. Article 47 of that document defines the term "mercenary" and
provides that
A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.

The drafting of such a provision and its inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I was,
of course, a matter within the discretion of the Diplomatic Conference.
However, what is bothersome is that all attempts to provide in that article that
if the individual alleged to be a mercenary was tried as an illegal combatant, he
would be entitled to proper trial safeguards, to the "Fundamental guarantees"
ofArticle 75 of the Protocol, 19 a privilege accorded to the members ofliberation
movements who fail to comply with certain provisions of the Protocol and thus
become, in effect, illeF combatants. Numerous aspects of the trial of the
mercenaries in Angola2 appear to warrant considerable pessimism with respect
to the fairness of the trials that these individuals will receive.
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Conclusion
Apart from the weakness of the prOVlSlons calling for international
cooperation in the prosecution ofpre-capture offenses, including the extradition
of persons charged with such offenses, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
1977 Protocol I establish a number of substantive offenses and provide for the
trials of persons accused of having committed those offenses, at the same time
granting them all of the safeguards necessary to assure a fair trial. Any problems
which may arise in the future with respect to the trial and punishment of persons
alleged to have committed war crimes will not be because of a lack of applicable
law, substantive or procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because
of the improper manner in which it is applied.
Post-Capture Offenses

Introduction
There has never been any question but that a Detaining Power has the right
to try enem~fersonnel in its hands for offenses committed during the period of
internment. The problems which have arisen in this regard are usually
concerned with the actions of the Detaining Power in making penal offenses
out of acts committed by prisoners of war, when the same acts would not be
penal offenses if committed by its own personnel; in trying enemy personnel
before specially constituted "hanging" courts; in denying to enemy personnel
the safeguards of trial accorded to its own personnel; and in adjudging sentences
against enemy personnel in excess of the sentences which could be adjudged
against its own personnel found guilty of committing the same acts.
When the matter of a convention on prisoners of war was under review after
World War I, the Xth International Conference ofthe Red Cross recommended
that "An international code of disciplinary and penal sanctions applicable to
prisoners of war should be included in this Convention.,,22 That
recommendation suffered the not-unusual fate of attempts to expand the
international criminal law field-it was not accepted by the subsequent
conferences on the subject. However, over the course of the years the offenses
committed during the period of detention for which prisoners of war may be
punished, and the procedures by which they may be punished for those offenses,
have become highly institutionalized and, if there is compliance with the
provisions of the latest and currendy applicable set of rules in this regard, those
contained in the 1949 Third (prisoner-of-War) Convention, there should be
no valid cause for complaint either by the person convicted and punished, or
by his Protecting Power, or by his Power of Origin.
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Substantive Offenses
The Convention has reached a very simple solution to the problem of the
specific substantive offenses for which prisoners of war may be punished:
1. Article 82(1) of the 1949 Third Convention makes them subject to the
"laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the
Detaining Power" and authorizes the Detaining Power to take
appropriate action for violations of those laws, regulations and orders.
2. Article 82(2) of that Convention provides that ifany law, regulation or
order of the Detaining Power makes an act committed by a prisoner of
war punishable when that same act committed by a member ofits own
forces would not be punishable, the maximum allowable punishment
is to be disciplinary, not penal, in nature.
By this means the Convention has, with respect to penal matters, equated the
prisoner of war to the member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. It
has, moreover, accepted the fact that there will necessarily be some special rules
of conduct promulgated by the Detaining Power which will be uniquely
applicable to prisoners of war-but it has placed severe limitations on the
punishment which may be imposed for violations of those special rules of
conduct.

Procedural Rules
General: a. A prisoner ofwar must be tried by the same court, either military
or civilian, that would try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
for the particular offense charged (Article 84(1»;
b. The trial court must be one which affords the prisoner-of-war accused
"the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
recognized" (Article 84(2»;
c. Double jeopardy (non bis in idem) is specifically prohibited (Article 86);
d. The penalty assessed against a prisoner ofwar may not exceed that provided
for in respect of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article
87(1».
Disciplinary sanctions: a. This is a type of punishment for minor offenses
which may be imposed administratively by the camp commander or his delegate
(Article 96(2». There is probably an equivalent type of administrative
punishment in the armed forces of most nations;
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b. The accused must be advised of the charge and must be given an
opportunity to defend himself (Article 96(4));
c. The allowable punishments are limited to a monetary fine, discontinuance
of any privileges normally allowed by the Detaining Power above those granted
by the Convention, fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily, and a
maximum of30 days confinement (Articles 89 and 90(2));
d. The punishment must not be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health
(Article 89(3));
e. There are a number of provisions establishing norms for any confinement
awarded as a disciplinary punishment (Articles 88, 97 and 98);
£ It is here that violations of the offenses unique to prisoners of war
mentioned above will be punished; for example, there are several provisions
with respect to attempted escapes which, when unsuccessful, are punishable by
disciplinary sanctions only (Articles 91-94, inclusive).
Judicial proceedings: a. The offense for which a prisoner of war is to be
tried must have been such in the law of the Detaining Power or in international
law at the time ofits commission (no ex postfado laws) (Article 99(1)). Logically,
this provision should have been in the general provisions, with the prohibition
against double jeopardy;
b. Lists of the offenses punishable by the death sentence must be exchanged
as soon as possible after the outbreak: of hostilities and additions to those lists.
may not be thereafter made without the agreement of the two belligerents
involved (Article 100); and when a death sentence is adjudged, it may not be
executed until six months after notice of its imposition has been given to the
Protecting Power (Article 101);
c. Mental or physical coercion in order to extort a confession is specifically
prohibited (Article 99(2));
d. The Protecting Power must be notified of an impending trial three weeks
in advance (Article 104(1)) and must, except in rare cases involving state security,
be permitted to attend the trial (Article 105(5)); proof of the notification is
jurisdictional (Article 104(4));
e. The accused is entitled to particulars of the charge and other documents
in a language which he understands; to be represented by counsel of his own
choice, or one provided by the Protecting Power, or one provided by the
Detaining Power; to confer with counsel freely and privately; to confer with
and to call witnesses; to have the services of an interpreter (Article 105); and to
have a full opportunity to present his defense (Article 99(3));
£ The punishment which may be imposed upon conviction is limited to that
which could be imposed upon a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power convicted of the same offense (Article 87(1));
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g. The accused is entitled to the same rights of appeal as a member of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article 106);
, h. There are a number of provisions establishing norms for any confinement
adjudged by the court (Articles 88 and 108).23

Conclusion
Under the able guidance of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
in the course of drafting the 1949 Third Convention the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference modernized the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention with respect to the trial and punishment of prisoners of war for
offenses committed while in that status. Although there has, fortunately, been
no occasion to test the application of these provisions on a wide scale they do
appear to ensure fair and just treatment for prisoners of war accused of
post-capture offenses. Once again, it may be stated that any problems which
may arise will not be because of a lack of applicable law, substantive or
procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because of the improper
manner in which it is applied.
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Addendum
Mter the end of W orId War II in 1945 the victorious Allied Powers
established International Military Tribunals for the trials of the major German
and Japanese war criminals, as well as many other tribunals and military
commissions for the trials of other persons who were deemed guilty of having
violated the law of war. Hundreds of such trials were conducted. (probably the
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last of those trials were those of Klaus Barbie, decided on 4 July 1987, and of
Paul Touvier, decided on 20 Apri11994, both by French Cours d'Assises. In
October 1997 proceedings were instituted in a Bordeaux court charging Maurice
Papon, once a member of post-war French cabinets, with responsiblity for the
deaths of1,090 FrenchJews during World War II.)
Despite the many international wars which have taken place since 1945 and
the many violations of the law of war which have been committed during the
course of those conflicts, there has not been a single war crimes trial arising out
of violations of the law of war which had occurred during those conflicts. (The
United States tried William Calley and others for violations of the law of war at
My Lai, in Vietnam, but at the time these were not considered to be true war
crimes trials because the United States was trying its own personnel. Why this
should make a difference is difficult to understand.)
For subsequent developments in this area, see The Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the
Future (page xx hereof) and War Crimes in the Persian Gulf in the present
collection. In August 1996 the Congress enacted, and on 21 August 1996 the
President approved, the War Crimes Act of 1996} an amendment to Title 18 of
the United States Code, which reads as follows:
Chapter 118-WAR CRIMES
§2401. War crimes

(a) OFFENSE. Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States,
conunits a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances
described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject
to the penalty of death.
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are
that the person conunitting such breach or the victim of such breach is a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as
defined in section 101 of the lnunigration and Nationality Act).
(c) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the term 'grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions' means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the
international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12
August 1949 or any protocol to any such convention, to which the United States
is a party.

Under this statute the Calley Case would now be considered to be a war crimes
case.

